Instead of all these, man has by nature his reason and his hands, which are "the organs of organs" (De Anima iii), since by their means man can make for himself instruments of an infinite variety, and for any number of purposes. Therefore the intellectual principle is the form of man. If, therefore, the whole soul be in each part of the body, it follows that all the powers of the soul are in each part of the body; thus the sight will be in the ear, and hearing in the eye, and this is absurd. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Further, Christ's body always retains the true nature of a body, nor is it ever changed into a spirit. Of these certain Platonists said that the intellectual soul has an incorruptible body naturally united to it, from which it is never separated, and by means of which it is united to the corruptible body of man. Therefore if there were not in man some other substantial form besides the rational soul, and if this were to inhere immediately to primary matter; it would follow that it ranks among the most imperfect forms which inhere to matter immediately. Although the whole Christ is under each species, yet it is so not without purpose. Wherefore, after the consecration, the whole substance of Christ's body and blood is contained in this sacrament, just as the whole substance of the bread and wine was contained there before the consecration. And as a light body remains light, when removed from its proper place, retaining meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination for its proper place; so the human soul retains its proper existence when separated from the body, having an aptitude and a natural inclination to be united to the body. x). For it involves nothing unreasonable that the same movable thing be moved by several motors; and still less if it be moved according to its various parts. Further, when the cause is removed, the effect is also removed. For this sacrament is ordained for the salvation of the faithful, not by virtue of the species, but by virtue of what is contained under the species, because the species were there even before the consecration, from which comes the power of this sacrament. But substance, as such, is not visible to the bodily eye, nor does it come under any one of the senses, nor under the imagination, but solely under the intellect, whose object is "what a thing is" (De Anima iii). 3 - OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES) Question. Moreover it is perceived differently by different intellects. God, however, provided in this case by applying a remedy against death in the gift of grace. I answer that, Such apparition comes about in two ways, when occasionally in this sacrament flesh, or blood, or a child, is seen. But if the species be abstracted from the conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the nature without those things which make it distinct and multiplied; thus there will be knowledge of the universal. Therefore as matter is apprehended as perfected in its existence, before it is understood as corporeal, and so on; so those accidents which belong to existence are understood to exist before corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood in matter before the form, not as regards all its effects, but as regards the subsequent effect. Entdecke Aquinas' Summa Theologica (SCM kurz) - Taschenbuch NEU Daniel, David M 28. However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action form yours by the distinction of the phantasmsthat is to say, were there one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in youif the phantasm itself, as it is one thing in me and another in you, were a form of the possible intellect; since the same agent according to divers forms produces divers actions; as, according to divers forms of things with regard to the same eye, there are divers visions. SUMMA THEOLOGICA: Prima Pars Predestination (23) and the book of life (24). But primary matter cannot be moved (Phys. But to be in a place is an accident of a body; hence "where" is numbered among the nine kinds of accidents. The embryo has first of all a soul which is merely sensitive, and when this is removed, it is supplanted by a more perfect soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual: as will be shown further on (I:118:2 ad 2). 76 - OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES) But the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its completeness; because what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. To this end, Aquinas cites proofs for the existence of God and outlines the activities and nature of God. It discusses topics central to Christian morality, ethics, law, and the life of Christ, providing philosophical and theological solutions to common arguments and questions surrounding the Christian faith. Hence we read in the profession of faith at Ephesus (P. I., chap. It cannot be said that they are united by the one body; because rather does the soul contain the body and make it one, than the reverse. This is not the case with other non-subsistent forms. But the shape is united to the wax without a body intervening. The Second Part deals with man in greater depth, and the Third Part discusses Jesus Christ, who serves as mediator between God and man in Christian thought. The reason therefore why Socrates understands is not because he is moved by his intellect, but rather, contrariwise, he is moved by his intellect because he understands. But it sometimes happens that such apparition comes about not merely by a change wrought in the beholders, but by an appearance which really exists outwardly. Therefore the soul is united to the human body by means of a body. ii) that "when our pretense is referred to some significance, it is not a lie, but a figure of the truth." The Summa Theologica is divided into three parts. But the dimensive quantity of the bread remains in this sacrament, as is evident to our senses. I answer that, We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. Therefore it is impossible for the entire dimensive quantity of Christ's body to be there. Animal. No angel, good or bad, can see anything with a bodily eye, but only with the mental eye. On the contrary, As long as a thing remains the same, it cannot at the same time be seen by the same eye under diverse species. Therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by means of a power, which is an accident. Now it is clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue of its very being, is united to the body as its form; yet, after the dissolution of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own being. Therefore if the intellect and Socrates are united in the above manner, the action of the intellect cannot be attributed to Socrates. Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph. Now the accidents of Christ's body are in this sacrament by means of the substance; so that the accidents of Christ's body have no immediate relationship either to this sacrament or to adjacent bodies; consequently they do not act on the medium so as to be seen by any corporeal eye. As has been already stated (III:75:5, after the consecration of the bread into the body of Christ, or of the wine into His blood, the accidents of both remain. It is against these that Cyril says (Ep. The same is to be said of totality of power: since the whiteness which is in the whole surface moves the sight more than the whiteness which is in a small part thereof. Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would involve a plurality of species. Reply to Objection 1. Objection 3. This can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of species and forms. If, however, there is one principal agent, and one instrument, we say that there is one agent and one action, as when the smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one stroke. But various parts of matter are unintelligible without division in measurable quantities. But this would be impossible if the essence of the sensitive soul were the same as that of the intellectual soul; for an animal is such by its sensitive soul, while a man is a man by the intellectual soul. Whether the intellect be one or many, what is understood is one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not according to its own nature, but according to its likeness; for "the stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is," as is said, De Anima iii, 8. i, 4. But it is clear that the action of the visual power is not attributed to a wall in virtue of the fact that the colors whose likenesses are in the visual power exist in that wall. On the contrary, According to the Philosopher, Metaph. Is the entire Christ under every part of the species? F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliMARI IMMACULAT - SEDI SAPIENTI. vii, 2), that the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the form. In the body, the form of which is an intellectual principle, is there some other soul? Aa Aa. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. Now it is clear that because the colors, the images of which are in the sight, are on a wall, the action of seeing is not attributed to the wall: for we do not say that the wall sees, but rather that it is seen. I answer that, As was observed above (Article 1, Reply to Objection 3), because the substance of Christ's body is in this sacrament by the power of the sacrament, while dimensive quantity is there by reason of real concomitance, consequently Christ's body is in this sacrament substantively, that is, in the way in which substance is under dimensions, but not after the manner of dimensions, which means, not in the way in which the dimensive quantity of a body is under the dimensive quantity of place. 1 First Part. But the materiality of the knower, and of the species whereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the universal. But the intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was shown above (I:75:6), remains separate from the body, after the dissolution of the body. Hence if this sacrament had been celebrated then, the body of Christ would have been under the species of the bread, but without the blood; and, under the species of the wine, the blood would have been present without the body, as it was then, in fact. There is also a whole which is divided into logical and essential parts: as a thing defined is divided into the parts of a definition, and a composite into matter and form. But the proper totality of substance is contained indifferently in a small or large quantity; as the whole nature of air in a great or small amount of air, and the whole nature of a man in a big or small individual. Therefore it is impossible for there to be in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul. The Commentator held that this union is through the intelligible species, as having a double subject, in the possible intellect, and in the phantasms which are in the corporeal organs. Yet the first act is said to be in potentiality to the second act, which is operation; for such a potentiality "does not reject"that is, does not excludethe soul. Further, in the resurrection the saints will be equal to the angels, according to Luke 20:36. This is the case with every form which, if considered as an act, is very distant from matter, which is a being only in potentiality. Is the entire Christ under every part of the species? catholicism angels st-thomas-aquinas summa-theologica metaphysics user60527 asked Nov 2, 2022 at 22:05 1 vote 1 answer 111 views Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in man besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things. The first part covers the nature of God, creation, angels, man, and divine government (sovereignty). I answer that, It is absolutely necessary to confess according to Catholic faith that the entire Christ is in this sacrament. vii, 19), that "the soul administers the body by light," that is, by fire, "and by air, which is most akin to a spirit." But this link or union does not sufficiently explain the fact, that the act of the intellect is the act of Socrates. Objection 2. Whence it is clear that when the soul is called the act, the soul itself is included; as when we say that heat is the act of what is hot, and light of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light were two separate things, but because a thing is made lucid by the light. From this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third objections: since, in order that man may be able to understand all things by means of his intellect, and that his intellect may understand immaterial things and universals, it is sufficient that the intellectual power be not the act of the body. Further, as stated above (Article 4), the body of Christ is in this sacrament with its dimensive quantity, and with all its accidents. ii, 1). Nevertheless, since the substance of Christ's body is not really deprived of its dimensive quantity and its other accidents, hence it comes that by reason of real concomitance the whole dimensive quantity of Christ's body and all its other accidents are in this sacrament. Is the soul wholly in each part of the body. Objection 4. Further, all the powers of the soul are rooted in the essence of the soul. But in this sacrament the dimensive quantity of the bread is there after its proper manner, that is, according to commensuration: not so the dimensive quantity of Christ's body, for that is there after the manner of substance, as stated above (Reply to Objection 1). Is the body of Christ in this sacrament locally? For the nature of each thing is shown by its operation. Accordingly, when our Lord said (John 6:56): "My flesh is meat indeed," there the word flesh is put for the entire body, because according to human custom it seems to be more adapted for eating, as men commonly are fed on the flesh of animals, but not on the bones or the like. Objection 3. Therefore we must presuppose accidents to be in matter before the substantial form; and therefore before the soul, since the soul is a substantial form. Thus from the very operation of the intellect it is made clear that the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form. Reply to Objection 1. Objection 3. And therefore had this sacrament been celebrated during those three days when He was dead, the soul of Christ would not have been there, neither by the power of the sacrament, nor from real concomitance. Thirdly, because the action of a motor is never attributed to the thing moved, except as to an instrument; as the action of a carpenter to a saw. Reply to Objection 3. Some of the powers of the soul are in it according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the body, namely the intellect and the will; whence these powers are not said to be in any part of the body. Therefore it seems to be united to the body by means of an incorruptible body, and such would be some heavenly light, which would harmonize the elements, and unite them together. Now the substantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming a thing is said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted simply. Therefore Christ's body is in this sacrament locally. ii, 3) that the relation of universal causes to universals is like the relation of particular causes to individuals. And among men, those who have the best sense of touch have the best intelligence. But all men are of one species. I answer that, If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not united to the body as its form, but only as its motor, as the Platonists maintain, it would necessarily follow that in man there is another substantial form, by which the body is established in its being as movable by the soul. Acknowledgement: This digital file was produced through the kindness of Sandra K. Perry, Perrysburg, Ohio. Objection 3. Theol.Imprimatur. For it is manifest that, supposing there is one principal agent, and two instruments, we can say that there is one agent absolutely, but several actions; as when one man touches several things with his two hands, there will be one who touches, but two contacts. But the species of anything is derived from its form. Our bodily eye, on account of the sacramental species, is hindered from beholding the body of Christ underlying them, not merely as by way of veil (just as we are hindered from seeing what is covered with any corporeal veil), but also because Christ's body bears a relation to the medium surrounding this sacrament, not through its own accidents, but through the sacramental species. Therefore, from the fact that the species of phantasms are in the possible intellect, it does not follow that Socrates, in whom are the phantasms, understands, but that he or his phantasms are understood. It seems that the whole Christ is not contained under this sacrament, because Christ begins to be in this sacrament by conversion of the bread and wine. It seems, therefore, that the same individual knowledge which is in the master is communicated to the disciple; which cannot be, unless there is one intellect in both. And so the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that the intellect is separate, because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ. On the contrary, The gloss on 1 Corinthians 11:25, commenting on the word "Chalice," says that "under each species," namely, of the bread and wine, "the same is received"; and thus it seems that Christ is entire under each species. 1.1 Introduction. Now mingling does not result from matter alone; for then we should have mere corruption. But the soul is a substantial form; and therefore it must be the form and the act, not only of the whole, but also of each part. A sign of which is that we observe "those who are refined in body are well endowed in mind," as stated in De Anima ii, 9. For the proper qualities of the elements remain, though modified; and in them is the power of the elementary forms. Reply to Objection 2. A proof of which is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body retains its proper action; although that which retains its species, retains the action of the species. Reply to Objection 6. Therefore by the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a thing is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively. If, however, the intellectual soul be united to the body as its substantial form, as we have said above (Article 1), it is impossible for another substantial form besides the intellectual soul to be found in man. Reply to Objection 1. Consequently the body of Christ fills that place. But each part of the human body is not an organic body. This power is called the intellect. But Christ's body is at rest in heaven. It seems that Christ is not entire under every part of the species of bread and wine. Therefore, it is impossible for matter to be apprehended as hot, or as having quantity, before it is actual. Answers: 1. Nom. It is separate indeed according to its intellectual power, because the intellectual power does not belong to a corporeal organ, as the power of seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding is an act which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, like the act of seeing. But the difference which constitutes man is "rational," which is applied to man on account of his intellectual principle. And therefore those accidents of Christ's body which are intrinsic to it are in this sacrament. Objection 2. Man must therefore derive his species from that which is the principle of this operation. vii, 3); and consequently it is impossible for any substantial form to receive "more" or "less." And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of living things, that whereby we primarily perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. Now the proper operation of man as man is to understand; because he thereby surpasses all other animals. Reply to Objection 2. Therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is in the whole surface and in each part thereof, it is necessary to distinguish. Because His body ceases to be under this sacrament when the sacramental species cease to be present, as stated above (Article 6). Objection 1. So therefore quantitative totality cannot be attributed to the soul, either essentially or accidentally. Christ's own bodily eye sees Himself existing under the sacrament, yet it cannot see the way in which it exists under the sacrament, because that belongs to the intellect. Edus. New English Translation of St. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae (Summa Theologica) by Alfred J. Freddoso University of Notre Dame Prima Pars (Part 1) Table of contents: Part 1: . But inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, it has not an existence apart from the existence of the body, but by its own existence is united to the body immediately. On the contrary, When such apparition takes place, the same reverence is shown to it as was shown at first, which would not be done if Christ were not truly there, to Whom we show reverence of "latria." But this is even still more impossible. The artisan, for instance, for the form of the saw chooses iron adapted for cutting through hard material; but that the teeth of the saw may become blunt and rusted, follows by force of the matter itself. It would seem that the whole soul is not in each part of the body; for the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. But when such apparitions occur, it is evident that Christ is not present under His own species, because the entire Christ is contained in this sacrament, and He remains entire under the form in which He ascended to heaven: yet what appears miraculously in this sacrament is sometimes seen as a small particle of flesh, or at times as a small child. It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according to the opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), it is supposed that the intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is the form of man. Objection 6. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied according to the number of bodies, it follows that the bodies being removed, the number of souls would not remain; but from all the souls there would be but a single remainder. I answer that, The eye is of two kinds, namely, the bodily eye properly so-called, and the intellectual eye, so-called by similitude. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that the intellect is "separate," and that it is not the act of any body. Objection 5. FIRST PART (QQ. Animae xxxii) says: "If I were to say that there are many human souls, I should laugh at myself."
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